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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO 
Judge R. Brooke Jackson 
 
Civil Action No. 16-cv-001449-RBJ 
 
LARSEN LAW OFFICES, LLC, a Colorado Limited Liability Company, 
 
Plaintiff,  
 
v.  
 
DAVID M. LARSON d/b/a Larson Law Office, and 
DAVID M. LARSON, PLLC, 
 
Defendants.  
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This order addresses defendant David M. Larson’s partial motion to dismiss [ECF No. 
14] and motion for a protective order [ECF No. 31].  The Court grants the motion to dismiss, sua 
sponte orders that the case be bifurcated into a liability phase followed, if necessary, by a 
damages phase, and denies the motion for a protective order but stays the discovery at issue in 
that motion.  
BACKGROUND 
Two lawyers, both alike in dignity, in fair Colorado, share similar surnames.  See William 
Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 1, prologue.  Plaintiff Larsen Law Offices, headed by Susan 
Larsen, has used its name since 2003.  ECF No. 34 at ¶¶ 12, 22.  David M. Larson did business 
under the name Larson Law Office for several years.  Id. ¶ 26.  He registered the website 
davidlarsonlawoffice.com in 2013.  Id. ¶ 28.  Three years later, plaintiff noticed Mr. Larson’s 
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website and sent him a cease-and-desist letter, demanding that he stop using the name Larson 
Law Office.  ECF No. 34, Ex. F, at 1, 5.  Mr. Larson did not respond to this or any follow-up 
letter, and plaintiff filed suit.  ECF No. 34 at ¶¶ 43–51.   
 Mr. Larson submitted an answer and a counterclaim, seeking declaratory judgment that 
he may continue to use the name Larson Law Office.  ECF No. 13.  That same day he filed a 
partial motion to dismiss.  ECF No. 14.  Plaintiff’s response to this motion withdrew two of its 
claims and noted that Mr. Larson’s website has removed all references to Larson Law Offices, 
instead identifying his business as David M. Larson, PLLC.  ECF No. 17 at 7 n.2.   
Plaintiff subsequently moved to amend its complaint to formally retract the two claims, 
bring in defendant David M. Larson, PLLC, and cover a second website operated by Mr. 
Larson—larsonlawoffice.com—which hosts the same content as davidlarsonlawoffice.com.  
ECF No. 25 at 1.  The Court granted the motion to amend and offered defendants the opportunity 
to supplement the motion to dismiss rather than refile it.  ECF No. 33.  Defendants opted not to 
supplement the motion, but submitted an updated answer and counterclaim.  See ECF No. 36. 
Defendant Mr. Larson has also moved for a protective order to forbid or limit discovery 
of his financial information.  ECF No. 31.   
The motion to dismiss and motion for a protective order are now ripe.  See ECF Nos. 21, 
35. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 
F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
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(2007)).  While the Court must accept the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and 
construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Robbins v. Wilkie, 300 F.3d 1208, 1210 
(10th Cir. 2002), purely conclusory allegations are not entitled to be presumed true, Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).  However, so long as the plaintiff offers sufficient factual 
allegations such that the right to relief is raised above the speculative level, he has met the 
threshold pleading standard.  See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.  “The court’s function on a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to 
assess whether the plaintiff’s complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief 
may be granted.”  Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 
1999) (quoting Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1565 (10th Cir. 1991)). 
 ANALYSIS 
Defendant Mr. Larson seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s cybersquatting claim and a protective 
order for his personal financial information.  The Court will address each issue in turn.  
A. Cybersquatting.  
Under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, a defendant may be liable to the 
owner of a mark if he “has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark” and registers or uses an 
Internet domain name that, “in the case of a mark that is distinctive at the time of registration of 
the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark.”  15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) 
(2012).  The Act supplies several factors that a court may consider in determining whether a 
person has “bad faith intent,” including: “the extent to which the domain name consists of the 
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person,” and 
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“the person’s prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of 
any goods or services.”  Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i).   
Plaintiff contends that Mr. Larson has registered and used the websites 
davidlarsonlawoffice.com and larsonlawoffice.com with bad faith intent to profit from possible 
confusion with plaintiff’s business.  In plaintiff’s view, the mere fact that Mr. Larson registered 
these websites years after plaintiff began doing business as Larsen Law Offices “support[s] the 
reasonable inference that [Mr. Larson], when he registered the domain names, knew of Plaintiff’s 
practice and her [sic] superior rights in the LARSEN LAW OFFICES marks.”  ECF No. 17 at 5.  
Plaintiff continues: “Any Google search for Colorado attorneys would have brought up 
Plaintiff’s name, for which reason it is plausible if not likely that Defendant was aware of 
Plaintiff and her [sic] superior rights in the LARSEN LAW OFFICES marks.”  Id.  Plaintiff also 
argues that Mr. Larson acted in bad faith by failing to respond to plaintiff’s demand letters.  Id. at 
6.  
These arguments are not enough to overcome the motion to dismiss.  Plaintiff does not 
allege that Mr. Larson had actual knowledge of Larsen Law Offices’ existence in 2013, or that he 
has ever conducted a Google search that returned plaintiff’s name.  See ECF No. 34.  Instead, 
plaintiff urges the Court to infer that Mr. Larson had such knowledge based merely on his 
registering and using his websites, even though it is equally likely—if not more likely—that Mr. 
Larson took these actions because he did not know about Larsen Law Offices.  The Court cannot 
infer wrongful motive based on ambiguous behavior.  See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Where a 
complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the 
line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (internal quotation marks 
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omitted)).  Additionally, plaintiff cites no authority for its position that failure to respond to 
demand letters reveals bad faith.  See ECF No. 17 at 6–8.  This, too, is ambiguous behavior that 
does not necessarily indicate bad faith, although it might suggest that Mr. Larson needs a lesson 
in common courtesy.  Mr. Larson might have considered these cease-and-desist letters to be 
frivolous and unworthy of a response, especially considering plaintiff has already withdrawn two 
of its five claims voluntarily.  See id. at 1. 
Moreover, the only statutory factors implicated by plaintiff’s factual allegations cut 
against its argument that Mr. Larson acted in bad faith.  In particular, the websites 
davidlarsonlawoffice.com and larsonlawoffice.com both consist of a descriptive component 
(“law office”) and Mr. Larson’s name.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(II).  And Mr. Larson 
has apparently used these marks for years in connection with his legitimate business.  Id. § 
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(III).  Plaintiff does not allege, for example, that Mr. Larson has offered to sell 
these websites to plaintiff for profit or that he falsified registration information in obtaining the 
domain names.  See ECF No. 34; 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI)–(VII). 
Plaintiff has failed to plead a facially plausible claim for cybersquatting after being given 
the opportunity to amend its complaint, so the motion to dismiss must be granted.   
B. Protective Order.  
Next, Mr. Larson moves for a protective order to forbid or limit the discovery of his 
personal financial information.  ECF No. 31.  He argues that the discovery request was intended 
“to annoy, embarrass and oppress” him, and that the information is irrelevant because “Plaintiff 
is not asserting or seeking any actual damages in this case.”  Id. at 2.  
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Mr. Larson might be right that plaintiff served this discovery request to harass him, but 
one of plaintiff’s nineteen demands asks for disgorgement of “all profits realized while and 
arising from” defendants’ alleged wrongdoing.  See ECF No. 34 ¶ 89(j).  As a result, plaintiff’s 
discovery request might be relevant to establishing damages. 
But I am not going to let plaintiff go digging in the books of what plaintiff asserts is a 
competitor when its case is hanging by a thread.  Rule 42(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows a court to order a separate trial of one or more distinct issues “[f]or 
convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite and economize.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).  Courts 
have broad discretion in determining whether to bifurcate issues for trial.  Anaeme v. Diagnostek, 
Inc., 164 F.3d 1275, 1285 (10th Cir. 1999).  While bifurcation “is not to be routinely ordered,” it 
is appropriate in situations “where experience has demonstrated its worth.”  Angelo v. Armstrong 
World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 964 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) advisory 
committee’s note). 
Bifurcating the issues of liability and damages is appropriate here.  Plaintiff has already 
obtained most of the relief it seeks: Mr. Larson has changed his business’s name and removed all 
potentially infringing language from his websites.  See ECF No. 34 ¶ 58.  But plaintiff forges 
ahead simply because defendants continue to use the websites davidlarsonlawoffice.com and 
larsonlawoffice.com.  See id. ¶ 59.  The former domain name uses Mr. David Larson’s first and 
last name, casting doubt on the claim that this website could be confused with the site for Ms. 
Susan Larsen’s firm.  And plaintiff did not notice this website for the first three years of the 
site’s existence, suggesting that Mr. Larson’s legitimate business activities did not actually harm 
plaintiff.  See ECF No. 34, ¶ 28; ECF No. 34, Ex. F, at 1.  As for the latter domain name, 
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plaintiff’s exhibit shows that while Mr. Larson began using this website in 2016, the site has 
been used by others since 2001, if not earlier—at least two years before Larsen Law Offices was 
formed.  See ECF No. 34, Ex. K.  Furthermore, plaintiff uses the plural “offices” in its name and 
website despite having only one office, possibly because larsenlawoffice.com is used by yet 
another attorney whose last name is Larsen.  ECF No. 14 at 2 n.1; see also Larsen Law Office 
PLLC, http://larsencriminaldefense.com/ (redirected from larsenlawoffice.com).  Thus, plaintiff 
might have some issues of its own.   
I cannot say that it is completely inconceivable that plaintiff could prevail in the end.  
However, plaintiff is going to have to show me that defendant is liable for disgorgement of 
profits before his books become fair game.  Since this is a bench trial case, bifurcation is easy to 
accomplish as a practical matter.   
ORDER 
1.  Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) [ECF No. 14] is 
GRANTED.  
2.  Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) [ECF 
No. 31] is DENIED.  
3.  Trial in this case shall be bifurcated with the issue of liability to be determined first. 
4.  Discovery on the issue of damages (disgorgement of profits) is stayed, including, but 
not limited to, Plaintiff’s Interrogatory No. 8 and Requests for Production Nos. 10, 11, and 12. 
5.  If necessary, the stay on discovery shall be lifted and the second phase of the trial on 
the issue of damages shall be scheduled after the conclusion of the liability phase. 
 DATED this 14th day of March, 2017. 
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   BY THE COURT:   
    
  ___________________________________  
  R. Brooke Jackson 
  United States District Judge 
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